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VALIDITYOF THE RISK MEASURES
The preceding two chapters focused on what data
are and are not available and on the problems
involved in their interpretation. Before making use
of these series, we must ascertain that they do in
fact measure credit risk. Thus, we now turn to the
analytical tests of the validity of the data.
We have found three basic types of these series:
collectiondifficulties, characteristics
andcreditratings.Thelosses,foreclosures,
delinquencies, etc., that comprise the first group
aredirect ex post measures of actual lending
experience and, thereby, of credit risk. The time
series on credit terms, borrower characteristics and
credit ratings, however, are not direct measures of
credit risk and require validation. Before they are
used as indicators of risk, they must be shown to
be related in a significant way to one or another of
the measures of credit difficulty.
A number of the characteristics for which time
seriesareavailablehavenotbeendirectly
validated; that is, no test has been made which
covers that specific characteristic for that specific
type of credit instrument. The evidence is broadest
and deepest for consumer instalment loans and
home mortgages. In cases where evidence is sparse
or absent, we rely on the circumstantial evidence
provided by tests of similar characteristics or tests
ofthesamecharacteristicforothercredit
instruments.
The tests cited below were carried out by many
differentinvestigators. No attempt is made to
provide complete summaries of their findings, nor
to be exhaustive in terms of all the research of this
type. The intention is, rather, to present a synopsis
of themajor evidencelinkingtheloan and
borrower characteristics that we use as indicators
of risk to the measures of collection difficulties.
Ratios of Debt and Debt Payments to Income
The first general class of risk-related characteristics
that will be discussed are the debt.to.income and
debt-payments-to-incomeratios.Table4
summarizes the series of this class that are listed in
Part II of this volume.
These ratios are of several types and they tell us
different things about the risk position of the
credit structure. One type, the aggregate ratios of
debtoutstandingtoincome, show whatis
happening to the volume of credit in a particular
sector of the economy relative to the flow of
incomethatistheprimarysourceforits
repayment. They are, therefore, a measure of the
burden of the aggregate debt in that sector of the
economy.
These ratios are closely related to the maturities
ofthecreditinstruments —thelongerthe
maturities, the higher the ratio. Although the
evidenceismixed,asweshallsee,longer
maturities are usually associated with a higher
incidence of collectiondifficulty, suggesting a
similar relationship for debt-to-income ratios. In
addition, a larger debt generally means a lower
equity in the item for which the credit was used
and this tends to reduce the incentive for the
borrower to repay the debt.
A second ratio of this type, also an aggregate
measure,relatesthedollarvolumeofdebt
payments —principaland interest or interest alone
toincome. Despite the fact that this ratio does
not pick up the quality-effect of the maturity, in
thehouseholdsectoratleast(andperhaps
elsewhere), debt payments appear to be a more
appropriate numerator than debt outstanding for
the ratio to disposable personal income. Since
almostallpresent-dayconsumerand home
mortgage debt is amortized on a regular monthly
schedule and the balance outstanding is generally
not callable under normal circumstances, the ratio
of debt service requirements to income may be a




measurement lies in their aggregative nature; for
example, debt repayments of all consumer debtorsValidity of the Risk Measures 43
TABLE 4
Measures of Credit Risk:





I. HOUSEHOLD SECTOR, CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT
1. Aggregate ratios of total debt or pay- FRB, OBE, 4 3 259
ments to total income. Gorman
2. Ratios of debt or payments to income,SCF, FRB, 6 6 260, 261
debtor families. OBE
3. Ratio of payments to income, small HFC 1 0 263
loans.
H. HOUSEHOLD SECTOR, HOME MOR TGA GES
1. Aggregate ratios of total home FHLBB, NICB, 3 2 280
mortgage debt or payments to total income.Gorman, OBE
2. Ratios of home mortgage debt or pay-SCF 4 2 281, 282
ments to income, home mortgage debtors.
3. Ratios of home mortgage amount to FHA, VA 5 2 283, 285,
income, FHA or VA borrowers. 286
4. Ratios of housing expense to income,FHA, VA 14 3283, 284,
FHA or VA borrowers. 286, 287
III. HOUSEHOLD SECTOR, ALL HOUSEHOLD CREDIT COMBINED
1. Aggregate ratios of total or paymentsFRB, FHLBB, 3 2 306, 307
to total income. NICB, OBE
IV. BUSINESS SECTOR, GENERAL
1. Aggregate ratios of total cash flow to FTC-SEC, 3 2 309, 310
total debt or debt payments, nonfinancial orStatistics
manufacturing corporations. of Income
2. Aggregate times-charges-earned ratio, Statistics 1 0 309
nonfinancial corporations. of Income
VI. BUSINESS SECTOR, CORPORA TE BONDS
1. Times-charges-earned ratios, corporateAtkinson, 7 7 324, 325
bonds or direct placements. Cohan
WI. BUSINESS SECTOR, MOR TGA GES ON INCOME-PRODUCING PROPERTIES
1. Ratio of mortgage amount to rental, FHA 1 1 329
FHA multifamily housing mortgages.
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TABLE 4 (concluded)
No. of Series Source
Notes, Page Sourcea Listedb Datab
2. Debt coverage ratio, multifamily and LIAA 1
nonresidential mortgages of life insurance
companies.
1329
VIII. A GRICUL TURAL SECTOR
1. Aggregate ratios of interest charges onUSDA 1
farm mortgages to net income of farm
operators.
1333
IX. STATE AND LOCAL GO VERNMENT SECTOR
1. Aggregate ratios of interest payments or Hempel 3
interest plus retirements to general revenues.
1341
Total of Ratios of Debt or Payments to Income 57 33
aFor full description,see Source Notes.
bThecolumn headed "listed" shows the number of series of this category listed in PartIIof this book; the column
headed "data" shows the number of series of this category for which the data are published in Part II.
are generally compared with the income of all
consumers, both debtors and nondebtors (series
H15, HM1O). A rising proportion of families using
instalment debt or a rising proportion of home-
owners with mortgages will, therefore, bring about
an increase in the aggregate debt-payments-to-in-
come ratio, even though those consumers with
debt are on average committing no larger a share
of their income to debt payments.
The higher level of the aggregate ratio resulting
from a larger proportion of debt-using families
does indicate a larger burden for the household
sector as a whole, because the burden on new
debtors has advanced from zero to some positive
figure. It is important to realize, however, that the
higher aggregate ratio does not necessarily indicate
—thoughitis often interpreted to mean —an
increased average burden for debtor families or a
higher proportion of heavily burden borrowers.2
Several measures of this latter type are available
in the Survey of Consumer Finances made each
year by the Survey Research Center, e.g., the ratio
of instalment payments to debtor income (series
H17). Unlike the aggregate payments-to-income
ratios, the ratios compiled from data on debtors
alone do not move in part as a function of the
rising incidence of instalment credit usage and
homeownership. They indicate, more precisely,
the extent of the payment burden that debtors
carry.
The extent to which a rising ratio of debt
service to debtor income represents increasing risk
is difficult to estimate. One aspect of this question
is the use of the borrowed funds. In some cases,
the debt will simply add to the borrower's total
commitments, which increases the danger that he
will overburden himself. In other cases, however,
the debt will merely replace one type of paymentof the
with another; mortgage repayments substituting
for rent, for example, appliance loan payments
substituting for maid service or laundry service, or
auto loan payments substituting for commuter
fare. The substitution is not necessarily an equal
one and the borrower can still overextend himself,
but when the purpose of the debt involves a
substitution of this sort, there is somewhat less
chance that the repayment burden will overwhelm
the debtor than when the loan simply adds to the
borrower's total commitments with no reduction
of expenses. Further, where second-hand markets
are well developed, as in the case of autos and
housing,theborrower who findshimself in
economic difficulties has an opportunity to sell
the asset that is the collateral for the loan, and
thereby repay all or most of his remaining debt
obligation.
Arelatedquestioniswhetherdisposable
personal incomeisthe most appropriate base
againstwhichtocomparethedebtservice
requirements.Should the denominator of the
payments-to-income ratio be disposable personal
income or some other measure of income? As the
economy growsand incomesrise,thebasic
necessities of life require a smaller share of the
consumer's income. Kisselgoff found that changes
in consumer credit were associated especially with
income "over and above the amount necessary to
meet essential living costs."3 Thus the consumer's
debt-carrying capacity probably rises more rapidly
thanhisspendable income, and discretionary
income would be a better base than disposable
income for the ratio of debt payments to income.
Although this appears valid, no wholly satisfactory
measure of discretionary income is available; hence
all of the consumer debt-service-to-income ratios
inthispaperarecalculated with disposable
personal income as the denominator.4
In addition to the Survey of Consumer Finances
data cited above, there are available also time
series on the ratio of housing expense (mortgage
payments, real estate taxes, repairs and utilities) to
income of new borrowers on FHA-insured and
VA-guaranteed home mortgages. The relationship
betweentheseratiosofdebtpaymentsto
borrower income and credit performance has been
established in several analyses. A Housing and
Risk Measures 45
HomeFinance Agency sample study of fore-
closuresin196 1-62onone-tofour-family
owner-occupiedhomesshowedasignificant
relationship between foreclosures and the ratio of
housingexpensetothe borrower's income.5
Another sample, provided by a large New York
bank,showedastrongrelationship between
delinquencies on Title I repair and modernization
loans and the ratio of fixed charges to borrower
income. Plummer and Young reported that the
repossession rate on appliance loans of the Electric
Home and Farm Authority were strongly related
to the ratio of monthly payment toincome.6
In one test the payment-to-income ratio did not
prove to be related to collection difficulty; this
was theregressionanalysis of home mortgage
default and foreclosure risk recently completed by
HerzogandEarley.7Thisisaparticularly
noteworthytestsince, unlike most others,it
simultaneously examined eleven different loan,
propertyandborrowercharacteristics.After
allowingfortheseother variables, "payment-
to-income ratios did not appear to be at all related
to default risk." Their data strongly suggested,
however, that"It may be that thisis simply
because lenders watch this ratio very carefully and
rejectloanapplicationsin which some fairly
conservative critical limit is exceeded."
Inadditiontothisevidence,thereisa
considerable history —goingback to 1938 —of
tests that have established a relationship between
loan experience and borrower's income per Se, that
is, without regard to the debt-to-income ratio.
Perhaps the most comprehensive are a series of
tests by Moore and Klein on data from a survey of
new car loans made by National Analysts, Inc., in
1954-55. This study shows, as did the earlier tests,
a clear inverse relationship between borrower's
income and both repossession and delinquency
rates.8
More recent evidence is found in a preliminary
report on a study that the Federal Reserve System
is now undertaking. "... averageincomes for
borrowers that defaulted were much less than for
other borrowers. As expected,... borrowerswith
low incomes (less than $2,000) had relatively poor
repaymentrecords."Interestingly,theyalso
reported, "However, further analyses showed that46 Measures of Credit Risk and Experience
borrowers with household incomes of $10,000 or
more also had relatively poor repayment records,"
and went on to note that many high-income
households "had more than one source of income,
primarily a working spouse. ...Combiningthe
two average level incomes may add to the family's
ability and desire to incur debt, but the additional
income may not always be fully available for
retiring debt. Thus, the income variable alone is
perhaps not sufficient information on which to
base credit quality."9
A later report on this Federal Reserve study
noted that "...12per cent of all auto loans
chargedoff were made to borrowers already
heavily in debt (those with more than 20 per cent
of their income already committed) when they
applied for the loan. In contrast, only 3 per cent
of the paid-off loans were to such borrowers.1°
Another type of debt-payments-to-income ratio
is used in the business sector.1 1These are the
times-charges-earned calculations used for corpor-
ate bonds and the aggregate ratios of cash flow to
debt and to debt payments.'2 These ratios relate
theearningsorcashflowof theindebted
corporation (before taxes and interest expense) to
the amount of interest charges or debt-payment
requirements xx both. Thus they are measures of
the protection that the creditors enjoy. Hickman
found the times-charges-earned measure to be a
very efficient indicator of the risk of default. The
default rate of those corporations that covered
their fixed charges by the smallest margin (those
with the lowest times-charges-earned ratio) was
seventeen times as large as the default rate of the
group of corporations with the highest earnings
coverage
Two more recent studies have confirmed this
evidence. Beaver, in an extensive analysis of the
abilityof variousfinancialratiostopredict
businessfailure, reported that "The ability to
predict failureis strongest in the cash-flow-to-
total-debt ratio."4 Altman, in a multivariate test
(multiple discriminant analysis), found that the
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total
assets made the largest contribution of the five
ratios in his final discriminant function, i.e., the
five ratios selected as doing the best over-all job
together inthe prediction of corporate bank-
ruptcy.l5
Ratios of Debt and Debt Payments to Assets
Another type of comparison commonly used to
judge the soundness of credit is the relationship
between debt outstanding or debt payments and
either (1) the value of the assets which back up the
debt or (2) some measure of the net worth of the
borrower. Unlike the debt-to-income ratios where
the focus is on the income flow as the basis for
repayment, these ratios to assets focus on the
margin of equity that the borrower holds, on the
value of the collateral for recourse should the bor-
rower get into financial difficulty, and on the
value of other assets, generally liquid assets, owned
by the borrower. Table 5 summarizes the credit
quality series of this class that are listed in Part 11
of this volume.
Probably the single most useful of these ratios,
certainly the most common, is the loan-to-value or
downpayment ratio. These ratios compare the
amount of the loan or the downpayment to the
purchase price or some other measure of the value
of the item on which the loan is made.'6 The two
forms are complementary: 100 per cent minus the
loan-to-value ratio equals the downpayment ratio.
The loan-to-value ratio is almost always used for
mortgages. The downpayment ratio is the more
common form for consumer instalment credit,
although sincethe mid-1950's thedealer-cost
ratio'7 has generally replaced the downpayment
ratio for automobile contracts.
Other things equal, a higher loan-to-value ratio
makes for a larger monthly payment burden and a
smaller borrower's equity. Two studies by govern-
ment agencies demonstrated the importance of
equity to the risk of credit difficulty. The Federal
Housing Administration found that over half of
their home mortgages in default had been out-
standing only three or four years, and 80-90 per
cent of the properties they acquired had been in-
sured within that time span. They concluded that
"the accumulation of equity with the passage of
time reduces the probability of property acquisi-
tiOns."18 Similarly, the Veterans AdministrationTABLE 5
Measures of Credit Risk:





I. HOUSEHOLD SECTOR, CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT
1. Dealer-cost or downpayment ratios onFRB, ABA, 14 6 263,265,
auto loans. FNBChi, 266, 268,
NASFCo 269
2. Downpayment ratios on instalment ABA 5 1 265
loans on appliances and other durables.
3. Aggregate ratios of total debt out- Juster 2 2 259
standing to value of the stock of consumer
durables.
4. Aggregate ratios of total debt or pay-Gorman, FRB, 4 2 259
ments to total liquid assets of households. National
Balance Sheet
II. HOUSEHOLD SECTOR, HOME MOR TGA GES
1. Loan-to-value ratios on home FHLBB, FHA, 53 12 283, 284,
mortgages. VA, USSLL, 286-290,
Guttentag 293, 294
2. Aggregate ratio of home mortgage Juster 1 1 280
debt to value of housing.
3. Aggregate ratios of total home FHLBB, NICB, 3 2 280
mortgage debt or payments to total liquid Gorman, FRB
assets of households.
4. Ratios of mortgage amount to liquid VA 3 1 286, 287
assets, VA borrowers,
5. Ratios of housing expense to liquid VA 3 1 286, 287
assets, VA borrowers.
HI. HOUSEHOLD SECTOR, ALL HOUSEHOLD CREDIT COMBINED
1. Aggregate ratios of total debt out- Juster, National 2 1 307
standing to value of assets or to equities. Balance Sheet
2. Aggregate ratios of total debt or FRB, National 3 2 307
payments to total liquid assets of households.Balance Sheet,
Gorman, NICB
IV. BUSINESS SECTOR, GENERAL
1. Ratios of net worth to debt, non- FTC-SEC, Statistics 3 1 309, 310,
financial or manufacturing corporations. of Income, National 312
Balance Sheet






2. Liquidity ratios, nonfinancial or SEC, FTC-SEC, 9 3309-3 13
manufacturing corporations. Statistics of
Income, National
Balance Sheet.
VI. BUSINESS SECTOR, CORPORATE BONDS
1. Ratios of debt to assets, industrial Cohan 2 0325
firms or public utilities making direct
placements.
VII. BUSINESS SECTOR, MOR TGA GES ON INCOME-PRODUCING PROPER TIES
1. Loan-to-value ratios on multifamily LIAA, FHA, 4 4329, 330
and nonresidential mortgages. Morton
VIII. AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
1. Loan-to-value ratios on farm mortgages. USDA, 3 2334, 335
Brinegar
2. Aggregate ratio of total farm mortgageUSDA 1 1334
debt to total value of farmland.
3. Aggregate ratios of total debt to USDA, National 2 1335
equities, agricultural sector. Balance Sheet
IX. STA TE AND LOCAL GO VERNMENT SECTOR
1. Aggregate ratios of debt outstanding Hempel, 2 1341, 342
to property values or to equities. National
Balance Sheet
X. OTHER SERIES
1. Ratios of collateral value to stock NYSE 2 0345
market debt.
2. Ratios of total debt to equities. National Balance 2 0
Sheet
Total of Ratios of Debt or Payments to Assets 123 44345, 346
aFor full description,see Source Notes.
bThe columnheaded "listed" shows the number of series of this category listed in Part II of this book; the column
headed "data" shows the number of series of this category for which the data are published in Part II.Validity of the Risk Measures 49
found that the proportion of defaults processed
which resulted in claims filed on GI home loans
declinedsharplyasthe borrowers' equityin-
crease d.19
The evidence relating loan-to-value and down-
payment ratios to credit performance exhibits a
pronounced correlation. Since the 1920's, empiri-
cal studies have consistently shown collection dif-
ficulties to be positively related to loan-to-value
ratios on home mortgages, and negatively related
to downpayment ratios on new and used cars and
on appliance loans.20
Strong evidence is also available from the agri-
cultural sector. Brinegar and Fettig uncovered a
marked relationship between the incidence of fore-
closure on farm mortgage loans made by the
Springfield Land Bank of the Farm Credit Admini-
stration during the period 1917-58 and the ratio of
the loan amount to the market value or to the
"normal agricultural value" of the farm.2' Jones
and Durand concluded that "an abundance of
statistical information confirms the importance of
the loan-to-value ratio. Both foreclosure rates and
loss rates tend to be high when the debt burden is
high. This tendency was found in all seven of the
studies that covered the subject."22
Turning to those ratios of debt to the liquid
assets of the borrower, we find a number of tests
establishing their usefulness as indicators of credit
risk. In the consumer sector, Durand found that
the ownership of bank accounts and insurance was
closely associated with loan quality. This evidence
was corroborated in Moore and Klein's analysis of
the 1954-55 survey of new car purchases, in which
both the net worth and liquid asset holdings of
borrowers were found to be strongly correlated
with loan performance. In the 1954-55 data, relat-
ing liquid asset holdings to delinquencies and re-
possessions brought quite striking results; about
one-third of the borrowers had liquid assets of less
than $200, but they accounted for three-fourths
of all repossessions and delinquencies.23
Although these appear to be very useful rela-
tionships for watching consumer credit quality,
there is, unfortunately, little time series informa-
tion of this sort available. The Veterans Admini-
stration has series relating home mortgage debt to
liquid assets (HM84-HM89). The Survey Research
Center published data in 1960 and 1962 on the
liquid asset holdings of instalment debtors, but
thesetablesarenotavailablefor subsequent
years.24 In the absence of other data, and al-
though they are certainly not as good substitutes
as we would like, we have included computed
ratios of total consumer debt, instalment debt and
home mortgage debt outstanding, and debt pay-
ments to the liquid assets held by all consumer
units. As in the aggregate ratio of debt payments
to income these series are deficient because there
is no basis for knowing to what degree the debtor
families are also holders of liquid assets or how
their holdings have changed over time.
Other series included here are the debt-to-
equity ratio for the consumer sector and the ratios
of home mortgage and instalment debt to the
value of major durables held by consumers. These
series have the advantage of being based on the
estimated current market value of the assets, so
that the relationships are not distorted by price
changes. At the same time, they have the serious
disadvantage of not being available on a current
and continuing basis.
In the business sector, there are a number of
balance-sheet ratios relating assets to debt that
have long been used as indicators of the financial
strength and solvency of business firms. These are
the worth-to-debt ratio and the liquidity ratios:
the working-capital ratio, the current ratio and the
quick ratio. The quick ratio is the ratio of cash
plus government securities to current liabilities. It
is a measure of the ability of a business firm to
meet itsshort-term liabilities from its quickly
liquid assets. It thus defines the minimum financial
strength of the company.
The current ratio relates total current assets
(the "quick" assets plus inventories and receiv-
ables) to total current liabilities. To the extent
that inventories and receivables are salable to their
full value, the current ratio is a more accurate
measure of a firm's financial strength than the
quick ratio. Since inventories and receivables often
cannot be turned into cash readily and without
loss (especially when the need to do so is greatest,
as in a recession), the current ratio is likely to be
an overstatement of the financial strength of the
firm. The current ratio, therefore, measures theTABLE 6






I. HOUSEHOLD SECTOR, CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT
1. Computed average duration of FRB, 10 6 267, 268
consumer instalment credit outstanding. FNBChi
2. Maturities (time to maturity) of auto FNBChi 2 1 268, 269
mobile loans held by sales finance companies.
3. Maturities of loans made on auto- ABA, FRB, 35 6 263,
mobiles. NBER, Juster, 265-267,
Hoithausen, 269-27 1
NASFCo
4. Maturities of loans made on durable ABA, FHA 8 2 265, 266,
goods other than autosor for property 271
improvements.
H. HOUSEHOLD SECTOR, HOME MOR TGA GES
1. Maturities of home mortgages made byFHLBB, VA, 47 8 283, 284,
five types of lenders. USSLL, FHA, 286-291,
Morton, 293-295
Guttentag
IV. BUSINESS SECTOR, GENERAL
1. Proportion of debt in long-term form,FTC-SEC, 3 0 309, 311,




V. BUSINESS SECTOR, BANK LOANS
1. Proportion of bank loans to manu- FTC-SEC 1 0 320
facturers with maturity of more than 1 year.
VI. BUSINESS SECTOR, CORPORATE BONDS
1. Maturities of direct placements. Cohan 4 0 326
VII. BUSINESS SECTOR, MOR TGA GES ON INCOME-PRODUCING PROPERTIES
1. Maturities of multifamily and non- LIAA, 3 3 330
residential mortgages. Morton
(continued)TABLE 6 (concluded)
No. of Series Source
Notes, Page Sourcea Listedb Datab
VIII. A GRICUL TURAL SECTOR
1. Maturity on farm mortgages recorded.USDA 8 1 335, 336
IX. STATE AND LOCAL GO VERNMENT SECTOR
1. Maturities of state and local Hempel 9 0
government bonds.
342
Total of Series on Maturities 130 27
aFor full description, see Source Notes.
bThe column headed "listed" shows the number of series of this category listed in Part II of this
headed "data" shows the number of series of this category for which the data are published in Part II.
book;the column
TABLE 7
Measures of Credit Risk:
D. Debt Composition
No.. of Series Source
Notes, Page Sourcea Listedb Datab
IV. BUSINESS SECTOR, GENERAL
1. Composition of business debt by Statistics 6 0
industry of borrower. of Income
2. Ratios of trade credit to total FTC-SEC, CRF, 8 2





V. BUSINESS SECTOR, BANK LOANS
1. Composition of bank loans by FRB 9 0
industry of borrower.
321, 322
IX. STA TE AND LOCAL GO VERNMENT SECTOR
1. Ratios of revenue bonds to all state Hempel 2 2
and local government bonds.
343
Total of Debt Composition Series 25 4
aFor full description, see Source Notes.
bThe column headed "listed" shows the number of series of this category listed in Part II of this book; the column
headed "data" shows the number of series of this category for which the data are published in Part II.52 Measuresof Credit Risk and Experience
maximum internal liquidity of a business firm.
The working-capital ratio is the ratio of net
working capital, i.e., current assets minus current
liabilities, to total assets. This ratio is similar to the
current ratio except that it uses total assets as the
baseagainst which to measure working-capital
needs.
The worth-to-debtratiocomparesthe net
worth of a firm to the total of its debt obligations.
It is a measure of the protection that the firm's
creditors have in the form of the equity capital
invested in the business, and is the most funda-
mental of the financial ratios from a long-range
credit quality standpoint.25
Several studies of successful and unsuccessful
business firms in the 1920's and 1930's found
these four ratios to be generally reliable —though
by no means infallible —indicatorsof business
failure. Groups of unsuccessful firms consistently
showed lower levels of theseratios than did
successful firms. Moreover, for unsuccessful firms
thüe ratios began to show persistent declines as
much as four -sixyears before failure. The work-
ing-capital ratio was the most useful of the four
indicators in this regard.26
In another examination of this topic, Saulnier,
Haicrow and Jacoby investigated defaults, fore-
closures and losses on business loans made by the
ReconstructionFinanceCorporationduring
1934-5 1relative to the current ratios and net-
worth-to-debt ratios of the borrowing firms. This
study indicated that loans to firms with poorer
financial ratios are more prone to encounter credit
difficulty
A more recent study of the effectiveness of
these ratios was carried out by the Bank of Israel
in a study of bankrupt companies in that country
during 1956-60. Their results confirmed the earlier
studies. Specifically they found the quick ratio,
the current ratio and the worth-to-debt ratio to be
significantly lower in the year before bankruptcy
for unsuccessful firms than for all firms. Interest-
ingly, the Bank of Israel study went one step
further than previous analyses, and calculated an
index of the risk of bankruptcy. For each firm this
is a composite measure based on the worth-to-debt
and current ratios, the trend of profits, the in-
ventory-to-sales ratio, the receivables-to-sales ratio
and the working-capital ratio. To test this com-
posite risk index, a sample of 130 firms was taken
from among all industrial companies operating in
Israel in 1958. Of the 21 firms with the lowest
scores, 11 went bankrupt between 1958 and 1960,
but of the 109 businesses with higher scores only 5
wentbankrupt.28
Two studies here in the United States provide.
confirming evidence on several of these ratios.
Beaver's study showed the debt-to-assets, work-
ing-capital and current ratios all to have significant
ability to predict business failure. And Altman's
multivariate analysis designed to predict corporate
bankruptcy included the working-capital and net-
worth-to-debtratiosinthefinaldiscriminant
function. However, Altman used the market value
of the equity rather than the book value in his
net-worth-to-debt ratio, reporting that the former
appeared to be the more effective predictor of
bankruptcy.
The time series presented in Part II of this book
for these four financial ratios are calculated from
the manufacturing data published by the FTC-
SEC, and from data for all nonfinancial corpora-
tions put out by the SEC, the Internal Revenue
Service and in Studies in the National Balance
Sheet of the United States.29 The FTC-SEC and
SEC data provide up-to-date quarterly figures,
while the other two provide valuable longer per-
spective.
Additional data on these ratios by industry and
size of firm, not presented here, are available from
several sources. The FTC-SEC release contains in-
come and balance sheet figures for twenty manu-
facturing industries and nine size classifications
(notcross-classified,however). The Industry
Studies Department of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
each year publishes fourteen financial ratios for
125 different lines of business in the retail, whole-
sale, manufacturing and construction sectors •30
Finally, Robert Morris Associates provide a wealth
of data for 190 different lines of business —manu-
facturers, wholesalers, retailers and nine service
lines —classifiedinto three size groups.31
Maturities
Another characteristic that is frequently related to
credit risk is the length of the contract. Table 6Validity of the Risk Measures 53
summarizes the time series on loan maturity that
are listed in Part II of this volume.
The relation between loan maturity and repay-
ment experience is a complicated one with several
different factors working in opposite directions.
On the one hand, for a given loan amount, the
longer its maturity, the smaller are the borrower's
monthly payments, and thus the lighter is his cur-
rent payment burden, i.e., the lower his payment-
to-income ratio, which would tend to reduce the
risk of ciedit difficulties. On the other hand, a
longer contract means a longer period of time
during which the income and financial position of
the borrower can change, thus increasingthe
possibility of credit trouble over the life of the
loan. Total payments from this debt obligation are
alsolarger,becauseof theinterestcharges.
Another influence operating in this direction on
instalment and home mortgage loans is the fact
that longer maturities result in a slower accumula-
tion of equity on the part of the borrower, making
his stake in fulfilling the loan obligation corres-
pondingly smaller at any given time.
Although the evidence is mixed, longer maturi-
ties are for the most part associated with a greater
risk of poor credit performance. Moore and Klein
found that longer contracts were typically associ-
ated with poor repossession and loss experience on
new car contracts (several studies) and on appli-
ance loans. On personal loans, however, the evi-
dence was inconclusive, and on used car contracts
shorter maturities appeared to have the higher risk
of delinquency. This latter relationship may have
occurred because the short-maturity loans on used
cars are generally on the oldest and cheapest autos,
which are usually purchased by the poorest credit
risks.32 Another contradictory piece of evidence is
reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
Their study of nonauto consumer loans showed
thatdefaulted contracts had, on the average,
slightly shorter maturities than did the loans that
were repaid.
In home mortgage lending, a number of studies
found the length of the contract to be positively
related to the prospect of default or foreclosure .33
Herzog and Earley's evidence is inconclusive, how-
ever. Their multivariate analysis showed the term
to maturity to be positively correlated with fore-
closure risk, but inversely related to the risk of
delinquency. Similarly, Knight's multiple regres-
sionproduced anambiguousresultonthe
maturity variable.
More often than not, therefore, the burden of
these studies points to a positive relationship be-
tween maturities and collection difficulties. The
exceptions, however, are sufficiently numerous to
raise some doubts and to keep us from drawing
any firm conclusion. Here, obviously, there is need
for simultaneous analysis of all credit characteris-
tics to try to determine the direction and amount
of influence, if any, maturity has on credit perfor-
mance.
Debt Composition
Because the riskiness of debt differs substantially
according to the industry of the borrower and the
type of debt, the quality of credit may vary
through time according to its changing composi-
tion.34 When an increasing proportion of total
debt is from relatively high-risk industriesdebt
types, a decline in aggregate credit quality is sug-
gested. When high-risk debt becomes smaller, an
improvement in quality is indicated. We thus in-
clude in our listing of credit quality information
several time series that show the percentage distri-
bution of certain business, bank, and state and
local government credit by major industry group
or by type. Table 7 provides a summary of these
series. In addition, credit ratings and failure statis-
tics by industry are included.
Several of the NBER Quality of Credit Studies
found differencesincreditquality among in-
dustrial sectors. Summarizing these studies, Earley
concluded that retail trade and durable-goods man-
u facturing weregenerallyhigh-riskindustries;
wholesale trade, services, utilities, transport and
communications were of relatively low risk; and
non durable -goods manufacturing, mining and con -
structionwere intermediate or ambiguous in re-
lative credit riskiness.35 The quality standings of
the various industries were not entirely consistent
inall of the comparisons by which they were
judged, however, and the matter deserves further
attention.
Trade credit is one of the largest types of busi-
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sectors. In 1961, bad debt losses in four major busi-
ness sectors were 1.2 per cent of the volume of
trade credit outstanding. By contrast, in that year
the loss rate on bank loans was .2 per cent and the
loss rate on consumer automobile credit written
by commercial banks was .3 per cent. Thus the
trade credit series warrant close attention.
The volume of trade credit has traditionally
been measured relative to the volume of sales
(rather than as a per cent of total business debt).
The ratios of trade receivables and trade payables
to sales volume are influenced by three factors: (1)
the relative amount of trade credit offered or in-
curred, (2) the terms (i.e., the maturities) under
which trade credit is granted, and (3) the difficulty
of collecting trade credit. The ratio of receivables
to sales, expressed as number of days sales out-
standing, is sometimes called the trade-credit col-
lection period.36 We avoid that term here, because
it implies that the ratio is solely a measure of col-
lection difficulty. A rise in the ratio of trade re-
ceivables to sales, however, can also mean that (1)
business firms that did not do so previously are
offering trade credit to their customers, (2) firms
are offering trade credit to a larger proportion of
their customers, (3) more customers are taking ad-
vantage of trade credit, or (4) trade credit is being
offered or incurred on longer terms than before.
Part, perhaps a large part, of the postwar rise in
trade-credit ratios may reflect these factors, as well
as an increase in collection difficulties.37
Two trends that have contributed to the in-
crease in the ratio have been the general shift by
businesses from item billing to lot billing (e.g., on
a regular monthly cycle), and the shift away from
cash discounts offered for prompt payment (e.g.,
"2/10, net/30" has in many cases become just
"net/30"). Both of these trends would increase the
relative volume of trade credit outstanding and the
trade-credit collection period irrespective of the
ease or difficulty encountered in collecting trade
credit.
Nevertheless, increases in the ratio of receiv-
ables or payables to sales may still indicate an in-
crease in the degree of credit risk because of (1) a
longer average maturity, which in other types of
credit is generally associated with poorer credit
performance, and (2) a larger relative volume of
credit outstanding in a sector that has long experi-
enced higher than average loss rates.
A third measure of debt composition included
in this compendium is the proportion of state and
local government debt in the form of revenue
bonds. As Hempel has pointed out, revenue bonds
historically have been much more prone to default
than general-obligationbonds. Thelatterare
backed by the full faith and credit standing of the
local government body and its full taxing power,
while revenue bonds are normally repayed solely
from the earnings of the facility (e.g., toll road)
for which the funds were borrowed.
Credit Ratings
Credit ratings are the judgments of experts about
the credit worthiness of borrowers and the degree
of risk encompassed in their debt obligations. In
large part, these evaluations are based on the risk-
related loan, borrower and instrument characteris-
tics of the sort discussed in the previous sections
of this chapter. In addition, they include a sub-
jective element reflecting credit factors for which
no statistical data are available.
The credit ratings presented in Part II of this
volume are summarized in Table 8. They are of
two types: agency ratings, which are the jucig-
ments of organizations whose business it is to
make and publish ratings of business firms and of
bonds; and examiner ratings, which are the judg-
ments of governmental examining agents about the
loans or mortgages held by financial institutions
over which they have regulatory responsibility.
Agency Ratings
Agency ratings are regularly published for busi-
ness firms and for corporate and municipal bonds.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., maintains credit ratings on
approximately three million business firms. These
ratings are based on the history and experience of
management, on the firm's financial position and
accomplishments, on the record of credit pay-
ments, and on other characteristics of the firm.
The ratings are designed for, and primarily used
by, mercantile concerns that grant trade credit.
The statistical validity of these Dun & Brad-
street credit ratings has been clearly demonstratedValidity of the Risk Measures 55
TABLE 8






II. HOUSEHOLD SECTOR, HOME MOR TGA GES
1. FHA ratings on insured home FHA 3 0 295
mortgages.
IV. BUSINESS SECTOR, GENERAL
1. Dun & Bradstreet credit ratings of D & B 19 6 314, 315
business firms.
V. BUSINESS SECTOR, BANK LOANS
1. Examiner criticism rates on bank loans.FRB Boston, 3 3 322
Wojnilower,
FDIC
VI. BUSINESS SECTOR, CORPORATE BONDS
1. Credit ratings on publicly offered Atkinson 4 1 326, 327
corporate bonds.
2. Credit ratings on corporate debt Atkinson 5 0 327
directly placed.
VIII. AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
1. Examiner ratings on farm mortgages Brinegar 3 0 336
or Production Credit Association loans, and Fettig
IX. STATE AND LOCAL GO VERNMENT SECTOR
1. Credit ratings on state and local IBA, 6 6 343, 344
government bonds issued or outstanding. Moody's,
Hempel
Total of Credit Ratings 43 16
aFor full description,see Source Notes.
bThe column headed "listed" shows the number of series of this category listed in Part 11 of this book; the column
headed "data" shows the number of series of this category for which the data are published in Part II.56 Measures of Credit Risk and Experience
a number of times. One of the most telling pieces
of evidenceisthe business experience of the
American Credit Indemnity Company, which uses
Dun & Bradstreet's credit ratings, along with firm
size, as a basis for its premiums for insuring trade-
credit losses. ACI data on the trade-credit perfor-
mance of its customers show a strong relationship
between credit losses and credit ratings: over the
period 1952-57, loss rates for firms rated "high"
were .09 per cent, while they were .50 per cent for
firms rated "good" and 1 .84 per cent for firms
rated only "fair" or "limited." Direct business
loans of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
from 1934 through 1951also showed a pro-
nounced relationship between default and loss
rates and the Dun & Bradstreet credit ratings of
the borrowing firms.38
Credit ratings on corporate and municipal bond
issues are made by Moody's, Standard and Poor's,
and Dun & Bradstreet. Hickman has demonstrated
that the record of agency ratings on corporate
bonds, both publicly issued bonds and direct
placements, based on cross-section tests, was re-
markably goodfortheperiod1900-43. For
example, on alllarge issues offered during the
period, only 11 per cent of the dollar volume of
bonds rated "investment quality" (i.e., in the first
four grades) went into default in those years, com-
pared to 42 per cent defaulting of those rated




series available for past periods, none is published
currently. This is unfortunate, as studies made of
these ratings strongly suggest that they can be a
valuable source of information on credit quality.
In his small sample of examiner reports. on
commercial banks, Wojnilower found that loan
criticism rates were positively related to credit per-
formance. Hisprincipaltestcomparedthe
examiner criticism rates with loss rates on a bank-
by-bank basis. The criticism rates were also found
to be statistically and logically related to credit
ratings and financialratios.4°Similarly,
Hsiu-Kwang Wu concluded from his study of
nationalbanksin New England"thatbank
examiner criticisms on business loans are reason-
ably accurate. They are good ex ante measures of
loan quality, and therefore they should be ex-
tremely useful as financial indicators in economic
forecasting. "41
Farm lending is another credit area in which
examiner ratingsprovedvalid.Brinegarand
Fettig's studies of production loans indicated that
charge-off ratesdifferedsignificantly between
loans graded "high" and "low" by Farm Credit
Administration examiners. Likewise, home mort-
gage "risk ratings" employed by the Federal Hous-
ing Administration to determine the acceptability
of loans offered for insurance appear to be related
to the probability of loss.42 Later, however, the
FHA ceased publication of these ratings because of
concern that they might be misleading.
Thus, both the agency ratings and examiner
ratings have substantial evidence of their validity
as indicators of credit risk, and deserve a full share
of attention when the risk position of the nation's
credit is being assessed.
Other Loan and Borrower Characteristics
In addition to the many credit quality series de-
scribed above, there are a number of loan and bor-
rower characteristics that at one time or another in
the past have been found to be associated with
credit collection difficulties, but for which no time
seriesis included inthis compendium. One of
these, interest rate differentials, was discussed in
Chapter 3.
In the household sector, these characteristics
are the presence or absence of junior financing
(secondmortgages)., the existence of previous
debt, the purpose of the loan, the borrower's
occupation, age, marital status, family size, time
on present job and time in current residence.43 In
each case, these borrower characteristics are not
included in this report because time series data are
not available for them.
In the business sector, there are two series that
have been used in other studies of the quality of
credit but are not included here. One is the pro-
portion of corporate bonds that are secured by a
lien on the assets of the borrowing company. Pre-
sumably, a bond secured in this way is of higherValidity of the Risk Measures 57
quality than an unsecured bond, other things
equal. The evidence linking this characteristic with
the risk of default, however, suggests that the
oppositeistrue:that unsecured bonds have a
better repayment record than secured bonds.44
The reason may be that other things are not equal,
that is, the secured bonds may be weaker in other
respects. In any event, because the evidence is con-
tradictory to the presumed relationship, this series
is not included in the present volume.
The second of these indicators of business
credit risk is the composition of business debt by
size of borrower. Borrower size has been demon-
strated in many studies to be closely related to
credit performance:thesmallerthefirm, the
higher the risk of collection difficulties.45 Thus a
time series of the proportion of all business debt
outstanding owed by the smaller firms would show
whether debt was tending toward or away from
the weaker sectors of the economy. In addition,
financial ratios and credit ratings by borrower size
group would indicate risk movements within the
weaker and stronger sectors.
A substantial quantity of data is available show-
ing the composition of business debt by size of
firm, and financial ratios and credit ratings could
also be shown by size breakdown.46 There is,
however, reason to question the usefulness of such
time series as they are likely to be biased over
time. All of the available data define the size
groups according to a fixed absolute dollar value,
usually of assets. The smallest category in the
FTC-SEC data, for example, consists of firms with
assets of less than $250,000. Over time, however,
with the growth of the economy and inflation, the
proportion of business firms thatfall into the
various size categories undergoes a marked shift,
with the "center of gravity" of the distribution of
total assets tending to move up the scale of size
categories, leaving relatively fewer assets in the
smaller categories. Consequently, if every firm
maintained its ratio of debt to assets at a constant
level, a time series of the pToportion of debt
accounted for by the smallest firms (based on
fixed size groupings) would show a downward
trend, and would therebygivean erroneous
impression of decreasing credit risk.
Also, since there is a typical pattern for finan-
cia! ratios and credit ratings by size of borrower,
with the smaller companies having the weakest
ratios, there would be within each size category a
downward bias in the time series of these risk-re-
lated characteristics. The series would thus tend to
give an erroneous picture of increasing credit risk.
It is difficult to judge how important such distor-
tions would be relative to the "real" movements of
these series; but in the absence of evidence that
such bias is not of significant proportions, it seems
prudent to be wary of them. Consequently, with
the exception of three Dun & Bradstreet credit
ratings series, no quality measures based on size of
firm are included in this book.
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